Title: Discussion 1 — Beyond Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
Course: AIINFRA 302: AI Security, Guardrails & Governance > Section: Week 01 — AI Security Landscape and the LLM Threat Model

💬 Discussion 1 — Beyond Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (20 pts)

This week's lecture and lab introduced the idea that agentic LLM systems — ones that can browse, retrieve documents, and take actions like issuing refunds — create attack surfaces that a chat-only, single-turn view of security cannot see. In Week 3 of this course, we will formalize this as the "lethal trifecta": a system that combines exposure to untrusted input, access to sensitive data, and the ability to externally communicate is dangerous almost by construction, regardless of how careful any single component is. Prompt: Given that framing, what does an LLM threat model need to add beyond the classic security triad of confidentiality, integrity, and availability once a model can browse, retrieve, and act on its own? Pick at least one concrete capability (browsing, tool use, memory, or multi-step autonomy) and describe a specific risk it introduces that confidentiality/integrity/availability alone would not capture. Ground your answer in at least one concept from this week's lecture or lab (the lifecycle table, an ATLAS tactic/technique, or a lifecycle stage). Post your initial response (150+ words), then respond to at least two classmates — ideally engage with a different capability (browsing, tools, memory, autonomy) than the one you wrote about, and note whether their risk is best addressed at the training-data, supply-chain, inference-API, or runtime-prompt stage.